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Abstract In this paper we shed new light on the Argument from Disagreement by
putting it to test in a computer simulation. According to this argument widespread
and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not
influenced by any moral facts, either because no such facts exist or because they are epi-
stemically inaccessible or inefficacious for some other reason. Our simulation shows
that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit by moral facts, we would
quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were affected by factors
such as false authorities, external political shifts, and random processes. Therefore,
since no such consensus has been reached, the simulation gives us increased reason
to take seriously the Argument from Disagreement. Our conclusion is however not
conclusive; the simulation also indicates what assumptions one has to make in order
to reject the Argument from Disagreement. The simulation algorithm we use builds
on the work of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif Soc Social Simul 5(3); 2002, J Artif
Soc Social Simul 9(3), 2006).
Keywords Hegselmann–Krause · Disagreement · Simulation · Meta-ethics ·
Moral realism · Opinion dynamics
In this paper we shed new light on the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to
test in a computer simulation. The Argument from Disagreement seeks to show that
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there are no objective and epistemically efficacious moral facts, i.e., moral truths that
somehow affect our moral opinions. This is because if objective and epistemically
efficacious moral facts were to exist, then there would be no more interpersonal and
intercultural disagreement in ethics than in, say, chemistry or mathematics. However,
there is in fact much more disagreement in ethics than in other areas, and therefore
advocates of the Argument from Disagreement conclude that either no such facts exist,
or if they exist, then they are epistemically inaccessible or inefficacious for some other
reason.
Sextus Empiricus was the first to offer a detailed account of the Argument from
Disagreement.1 In more recent years, J. L. Mackie’s discussion has been particu-
larly influential. According to Mackie, ‘[r]adical differences between first order moral
judgements make it difficult to treat those judgements as apprehensions of objective
truths.’ 2 This is because,
the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypoth-
esis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express per-
ceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective
values.3
Recent discussions of the Argument from Disagreement have revealed at least two
major weaknesses. The first is exemplified in Mackie’s treatment: He offers no or little
support for the claim that variations in moral opinions are more readily explained by
the non-realist hypothesis than its realist rival. Why, exactly, is it more reasonable to
think that people would stop to disagree if moral facts were to exist? Moral opinions
are affected by a large number of factors, including authorities and moral opinions
held by our peers and relatives, so advocates of the Argument from Disagreement need
to do more to convince us that the existence of moral facts would invariably lead to
consensus.
The second weakness, highlighted by several contemporary moral realists, is that
it is difficult to reconcile the Argument from Disagreement with the fact that we actu-
ally agree on many moral issues, such as the wrongness of torturing innocent children
for fun.4 More precisely put, it seems that we disagree on some moral issues, such as
abortion and capital punishment, but not on all. So how can claims about disagreement
disprove the existence or epistemic inefficacy of moral facts, given that we agree on
many—or even most—moral issues?
The aim of this paper is to show that a computer simulation can overcome both
weaknesses described above. If correct, the simulation will thus shed new light on
the Argument from Disagreement and, indirectly, the meta-ethical view we call non-
sceptic moral realism. Non-sceptic moral realism is the view that moral facts exist and
1 Against the ethicists, pp. 68–78, Outlines of pyrrhonism III, p. 190.
2 Mackie (1977, p. 36).
3 Mackie (1977, p. 37).
4 See, e.g. Shafer-Landau (2003) and Tersman (2006, p. xii).
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that they influence our moral opinions.5 The most influential account of non-sceptic
moral realism in recent years is Cornell realism, a view that is defended by Rich-
ard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon, and David Brink.6 Cornell realists believe that moral
facts are mind-independent facts that cannot be reduced to non-moral facts, and that
we under the right circumstances do in fact acquire knowledge about them. In many
cases, the existence of moral facts explain why we hold the moral opinions we do in
fact hold. Moral facts have a causal influence on our opinions.
Our computer simulation offers a detailed explanation of why the existence of moral
facts would lead to consensus on moral issues, and why we do actually agree on some
moral issues but not on others. This gives us increased reason to take the Argument
from Disagreement seriously. Our results are, however, not conclusive. The simulation
also indicates what assumptions one has to make in order to reject the Argument from
Disagreement. The simulation algorithm we use builds on the work of Hegselmann
and Krause (2002, 2006).
The structure of this article is as follows. In Sect. 1 we explain the basic configura-
tion of the computer model, which is thereafter extended and rendered more realistic
in Sect. 2. We model a scenario that includes moral facts and compare it to a scenario
without moral facts. Since the scenario comprising moral facts turns out to have no
or little resemblance with the world we actually live in, unlike the scenario in which
there are no moral facts influencing our moral opinions, we conclude that either there
is something wrong with the model or non-sceptic moral realism is false. In Sect. 3 we
offer some reasons for thinking that the last disjunct of the foregoing sentence is the
correct conclusion. We do this by showing that the model is very robust. Its outcomes
look very much the same even if the initial assumptions are modified quite dramati-
cally. Thereafter, in Sect. 4 and Sect. 5, we explain more in detail how our computer
simulation overcomes the weaknesses of the Argument from Disagreement outlined
above, and discuss what assumptions one has to make in order to reject the Argument
from Disagreement. In these sections we also reply to some possible objections.
1 The basic model
A successful computer model of moral reasoning should be flexible about how moral
opinions evolve and change over time. The model has to be able to account for the
influence of a number of factors, apart from moral facts, many of which we know rel-
atively little about. In this section we explain the basic configuration of the computer
model we use.
To start with, we wish to make room for the possibility that one’s moral opinions
are influenced, at least to some degree, by opinions held by others. People who think
abortions should remain legal may perhaps pay no attention to the most extreme views
5 It should be stressed that the meta-ethical position we attack is not an ontological position only, but
an ontological plus an epistemological position. For example, a reviewer has pointed out to us that the
meta-ethical position defended by Hartmann (1932) might not be vulnerable to our argument. This is
because on Hartmann’s view moral facts only have a short-lived influence on our opinions.
6 Boyd (1988), Sturgeon (1985), and Brink (1989).
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Fig. 1 ε = 0.3
put forwards by their opponents, but they are likely to take into account at least some
arguments put forward by people holding opinions that are sufficiently similar to their
own. We shall model this by adopting a generalized version of a model originally
developed by Hegselmann and Krause.7 Hegselmann and Krause assume that opin-
ions can vary continuously in an interval of real numbers. It is convenient to let the
interval be [0, 1]. Since a model is a purely mathematical construction, the outcome
of the simulation will not depend on the interpretation of the interval. However, to
give the numbers some intuitive meaning, we will assume that they correspond to
the agent’s opinion about the degree of moral praiseworthiness of the action under
consideration. In a discussion of abortion 1 would, for instance, represent maximum
praiseworthiness and 0 maximum condemnation of that practice, while 0.5 would
represent moral neutrality.
Figure 1 shows a simulation of a moral discussion between a group of 50 individu-
als, all of which initially hold different and evenly distributed opinions. All individuals
are aware of the opinions held by others, and in each round they modify their opinions
by taking into account views put forward by others. In this example, each individual
considers only opinions that are up to 0.3 units more positive or negative than the opin-
ion he or she held in the previous round. The term confidence interval refers to the set
of similar views that each agent is prepared to consider. (In the mathematical literature
the confidence interval is denoted by ε.) In the original Hegselmann–Krause model,
developed for non-moral purposes, it is assumed that disagreeing parties should ‘split
the difference’, that is, adopt the opinion that corresponds to the average opinion of the
set of opinions within the confidence interval. However, in order to make our model
more flexible—and thus less vulnerable to criticism—the extended model presented
in the next section assumes that agents are more conservative, in the sense that they
put more weight on their own opinion than those of others.
A striking fact about the original Hegselmann–Krause model is that the outcome
of the simulation is determined solely by each agent’s willingness to adjust his or her
7 Hegselmann and Krause (2002).
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Fig. 2 ε = 0.1
opinion to similar opinions held by others. If each agent’s opinion at each round is
influenced only by the view he held the previous round and other views that are within
the confidence interval, i.e., views that are sufficiently close to one’s own for being
worth considering, then consensus will arise just in case the distance between two
neighbouring opinions is never greater than the confidence interval.
In Fig. 2 the population is kept constant while the confidence interval is decreased to
0.1. Hegselmann and Krause refer to the two types of cases illustrated in Fig. 1 and 2 as
consensus and plurality. This strong correlation between the number of surviving opin-
ions and the size of the confidence interval is typical of the Hegselmann–Krause model.
The relationship is, however, not monotonic. It has been shown that in some intervals
the number of surviving opinions increases as the confidence interval increases.8 Fur-
thermore, Hegselmann and Krause show that patterns similar to those in Fig. 1 and
2 arise even if the confidence interval is asymmetric, i.e., if the upper limit of the
confidence interval is not equally far from the initial opinion as the lower limit.
A large number of modifications to the original Hegselmann–Krause model have
been studied in the literature. A modification that is of particular interest in the pres-
ent context is that proposed by Hegselmann–Krause in their (2006). In that model,
which we will call the truth-sensitive Hegselmann–Krause model (as opposed to their
original (2002) model) agents are not merely influenced by each other’s opinion but
also by the true fact of the matter. Hegselmann–Krause assume that only one opinion
in the range of opinions is the true one and investigate what happens if either all or
some agents let their opinions be affected by the truth (as well as the opinions of others
that lie within the confidence interval). The conclusion is that agents will eventually
reach agreement on the true opinion, with the exception for the case of an agent whose
(i) opinion is not affected at all by the truth, and whose (ii) initial opinion is too far
apart from that of others, and is thus not affected by those opinions either. In Fig. 3, the
dotted line represents the truth, which is assumed to be stable over time. The influence
from other peers is ten times stronger than the influence of the truth. (That is, the ‘truth
8 Lorenz (2007).
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Fig. 3 ε = 0.1 and 10 % truth attraction
attraction’ is 10 %.) All other parameters are as in Fig. 2. Note that by introducing a
true opinion, a case of plurality is transformed into consensus.
A number of mathematicians have attempted to obtain analytic results for
Hegselmann and Krause’s models. Krause (2008) proves a convergence theorem for
a limited number of cases, and Lorenz (2007) and Lorenz and Lorenz (2008) prove
generalized versions of the theorem. The ‘thunnel theorem’ in Hegselmann–Krause
(2006) shows that if all agents are sensitive to the truth, then consensus on the truth
will arise in the sense that all agents will eventually approach the truth. Moreover, the
‘leading the pack theorem’ in the same paper shows that even if only some agents go
for the truth this is sufficient for guiding the whole group towards the truth, given that
no individual opinion that is unaffected by the truth is at some point left isolated out-
side the confidence interval. The present paper makes no attempt to add new analytic
results to the literature on different versions of the Hegselmann–Krause model.
2 The extended model
It is a striking feature of moral discussions on abortion, capital punishment, and a num-
ber of similar issues, that we never seem to reach consensus. It is therefore interesting to
study what structural assumptions about moral discussions, if any, are consistent with
persistent disagreement. In particular, it is interesting to investigate whether persistent
disagreement is compatible with the assumption that moral opinions are affected by
moral facts that we somehow perceive or get acquainted with. In this section we will
modify the two models for opinion-dynamics introduced by Hegselmann and Krause
in their (2002) and (2006), such that they become more relevant for modeling moral
discussions.
In the original Hegselmann–Krause model, persistent moral disagreement is pos-
sible only if the confidence interval is sufficiently small. Otherwise consensus will
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quickly be reached, as shown above. Therefore, in the rest of this paper, we assume
that the confidence interval is sufficiently small to enable persistent disagreement, i.e.,
we will only study cases similar to that in Fig. 2. Although it cannot be excluded prima
facie that persistent disagreement could arise for larger confidence intervals once more
features are added to the model, we have found that this is not the case. (For details,
see Sect. 3.) In order to be on the safe side, we also assume that individuals are even
more conservative than before. In the extended model, each individual takes his own
view to count for several hundred times as much as his moral peer. Although this is
hardly rational, this makes the model less vulnerable to criticism, as will be shown
below.
Needless to say, it would be implausible to assume that moral opinions are affected
merely by opinions held by others. Other factors may also play a role. In the extended
model three such additional factors are incorporated into the simulation, viz. author-
ities, external shifts, and random processes. Naturally, the more factors that can be
incorporated into the model without affecting the overall result of the simulation, the
less vulnerable will its conclusion be to criticism. We do not wish to claim that all
moral opinions are always affected by authorities, shifts, and random processes. The
point is, on the contrary, that our conclusions will hold water even if these factors
affect how moral opinions change over time.
An authority can be conceived of as an influential person, organization, polit-
ical party, book, or philosophical movement. Typical examples include the Pope,
Greenpeace, the German Nazi party in the 1930s, Peter Singer’s book Animal Lib-
eration, and Aristotelian virtue ethics. All these entities might affect people’s moral
opinions, given that the distance between the authority’s opinion and that of the agent
is within the confidence interval. However, all authorities cannot be right about what
they preach, because on many moral issues they advocate inconsistent views. Further-
more, it is reasonable to assume that each authority tends to attract opinions over an
extended period of time, but the influence is seldom constant over time. In our model,
we assume that each authority, or rather each period in which an authority affects our
opinions, extends over a randomized interval of 10–30 rounds. (See Sect. 3.) Of course,
some authorities, such as the Church, tend to be influential during several periods. As
will be shown in Sect. 4 our conclusions will go through even if our moral opinions are
influenced by one or more constant moral authorities, i.e., constant attractors of moral
opinions that may differ from the truth. In Figs. 4 and 5 authorities are represented
as relatively short, thick horizontal lines. Contrary to what one might have expected,
the presence of a large number of authorities lead to more consensus rather than less.
Moreover, our simulations also show that the result will be the same no matter whether
the strength of each authority is constant or decreases with respect to the distance of
the opinion.
Sometimes external shifts, such as the political shift towards the left in 1968, affect
our opinions quite dramatically during a relatively short period of time. From a math-
ematical point of view, they can be represented as some subinterval of [0, 1] in which
all opinions are suddenly shifted either upwards or all downwards. A major difference
between external shifts and authorities is that authorities affect our opinions to a lim-
ited degree over a relatively long period of time, while shifts take place within just
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Fig. 4 The extended model without moral facts











Fig. 5 The extended model with strong moral facts
one round. However, in that round they have a relatively large influence on our moral
opinions. In Figs. 4 and 5 external shifts are represented by thick vertical lines.
The third new factor in the extended model is random processes. Sometimes opin-
ions change for no good (or bad) reason at all. This may very well be irrational, but
since the Argument from Disagreement starts from the assumption that people do
actually disagree, it seems wise to also take the possibility of random processes into
account. In our extended model we have stipulated that opinions change randomly
every 30–70 rounds, and that no random change is more than twice the size of the
confidence interval. These numerical assumptions are of course arbitrary. However,
as will be shown below, not much hinges on them. The robustness analysis presented
in Sect. 3 shows that our conclusions do not depend much on what assumptions we
make about the numerical values of these variables.
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Figure 4 shows a simulation in which the three factors introduced above have been
added to the original Hegselmann–Krause model (2002). The most important conclu-
sion to be drawn here is that no consensus is reached, not even after a large number
of rounds. In the next section we discuss what assumptions we have made about the
values of the underlying variables and the mechanism for aggregating their influence,
and we show that the result in Fig. 4 is surprisingly robust. This means that the figure
will look roughly the same no matter what one assumes about the size of the popu-
lation (relative to the confidence interval), the number of authorities, their position in
the opinion space, the authorities’ extension in time, the number of shifts, the strength
of these shifts, and the influence of random processes.
Enter moral facts. We take for granted that if they were to exist, they would somehow
affect our moral opinions in much the same way as the truth affects opinions in the
truth-sensitive Hegselmann–Krause model. Hence, we assume that if moral facts were
to exist, they would be invariant with respect to time—they would always be there.9
We assume that moral fact exercise moderate influence on our opinions. For simplic-
ity, we assume that the influence of moral facts is constant over time. Furthermore,
we assume that there is only one fact of the matter about each moral issue; hence, it
cannot be the case that, say, abortion is both morally praiseworthy and not, everything
else being equal.
A moral fact is represented by a dotted line in our plots. In Fig. 5 we assume that the
objectively true opinion is to fully reject abortions (i.e., its numerical value is 0), but
our simulations show that it is irrelevant to the overall conclusion of the paper what
the objectively true opinion happens to be: if the objectively true opinion is a random
variable, the total amount of disagreement will be slightly higher, but not dramatically
higher. (See Sect. 3 for details.)
To start with, we assume that moral facts affect our moral opinions to the same
degree as authorities, i.e., to the same degree as the Church or Peter Singer. Fig. 5
clearly shows that if moral facts were to have such a great influence on our opinions,
then consensus would have been reached within a relatively small number of rounds.
Suppose that a ‘round’ in the model is equivalent to, say, one month of discussion.
Then consensus on abortion would have been reached within a few years after the
discussion began. This is, however, not the case. Abortion is still a very controversial
moral issue, on which people hold very different moral views—despite the fact that
free and democratic discussions have been going on for at least a century. Therefore,
the assumption about the strong influence of moral facts on our opinions made in Fig. 5
is hardly a correct representation of the actual world.
But what if moral facts have far less influence on our moral opinions? In Fig. 6 the
influence of moral facts is one third of that of a single authority. Since the number of
authorities is large, and there is only one objectively true opinion, and opinions are
also affected by many other factors, the total share of the total influence generated by
the single objectively true opinion is thus relatively small. (The numerical values of
all these variables are listed in Table 1.) However, even if our sensitivity to moral facts
is that low, it nevertheless turns out that consensus will be reached within a moderate
9 We are aware that this assumption must be interpreted with care. Naturally, similar acts may have different
moral status at different points in time due to changes in the external world.
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Fig. 6 The extended model with weak moral facts











Fig. 7 The extended model with weak moral facts and many authorities
number of rounds. Moreover, this conclusion also holds true if the number of author-
ities is increased dramatically, (to 50 instead of 5) as can be seen in Fig. 7. Therefore,
since no consensus has yet been reached on abortion, our preliminary conclusion is
that moral facts about abortion do not exist, or at least do not affect our opinions to
any significant degree.
3 Further details about the extended model
In Sect. 1 and Sect. 2 we have tried to give a brief and non-technical overview of how
our model works and why it is relevant to the Argument from Disagreement. The main
point is that our moral opinions do not seem to be affected by any objective moral
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facts, because if they were, we would have reached consensus a long time ago. In this
section we offer a detailed presentation of the technical assumptions underlying the
model, and discuss their plausibility. The basic message is that the model is surpris-
ingly robust. Our conclusion will not change dramatically if the simulation is repeated
a large number of times, or if the initial values in each simulation are altered.
Opinions are represented by real numbers, which are updated in each round depend-
ing on the distance to other opinions, authorities, external shifts, random processes,
and facts. The initial opinion held by each individual is assigned by an even random
distribution. Time is modelled by the number of rounds the process is iterated. The
interpretation of time is of course somewhat arbitrary. In order to be on the safe side,
we assume that each round lasts no longer than one year, i.e., that individuals are
willing to reconsider their moral opinions at least once a year. Arguably, this is a very
conservative assumption. If opinions are actually reconsidered more frequently, say
once a month, our case becomes even stronger. This is because consensus would then
be reached much quicker. If each round were to last much longer, then people would
be too conservative for the model to be realistic. Therefore, it is not a problem that
the unit of time is to some extent arbitrary, as long as the assumptions we base the
simulations on are sufficiently conservative.
The numerical values of all parameters are listed in Table 1. The simulation lasts
for R rounds and in each round there are n peers each holding an opinion between 0
and 1. The views of all peers within ε affects the view of a peer. Each peer has a certain
lifespan that may be as low as peerMinAge and as high as peerMaxAge. When a peer
has reached the end of its lifespan it is replaced by a peer with a randomized view
within mutRnge of the view of its predecessor. There are authNr authorities that may
last from authMinDur to authMaxDur rounds. An authority affects the views of all
peers with a view within authRnge of the authority. Furthermore, there are shftNr shifts
that in a single round changes the views of all peers holding a view within shftRnge
from a certain view. The shift either increases or decreases the views of the affected
peers by shftPull. The truth affects all peers with a certain strength in all rounds. The
relative strength of the influence from a peer’s earlier view, other peers, authorities,
and the truth are consInfl, peerInfl, authInfl, TInfl. Let xi (r) be the view of peer i at
round r . Let authViewi be the view of authority i and let authDuri be the duration
of i and let authBegi be the start round for i . Let shftCntri be the centre of range of
views affected by shift i and let shftDiri be the direction i pulls, and let shftRndi be
the round i occurs.
We are now in a position to describe the simulation algorithm for the extended
model. See Fig. 8 for an accompanying flow chart.
The Simulation Algorithm for the Extended Model: Given the parameters (given
in Table 1) simulate the changes in views for n persons over R rounds.
1. [Initialize] Set r to 0. For i = 1 to n, set xi (0) to a random real number between 0
and 1 and set rToLivei to a random integer between peerMinAge and peerMaxAge.
For i = 1 to authNr, set authDuri to a random integer between authMinDur
and authMaxDur and set authBegi to a random integer between 1 and R and
set authViewi to a random real number between 0 and 1. For i = 1 to shftNr,
set shftRndi to a random integer between 1 and R and set shftDiri randomly
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to either −1 or 1. For i = 1 to shftNr, set shftCntri to a random real number
between 0 and 1 such that shftCntri + (shftRnge + shftPull) ∗ shftDiri ≥ 0 and
shftCntri + (shftRnge + shftPull) ∗ shftDiri ≤ 1.
2. [Increase round] Increase r by 1.
3. [Conservatism] For i = 1 to n, set consPointi to xi (r − 1).
4. [Peers] For i = 1 to n, set peerPointi to
{
xi (r − 1) if I (i, r − 1) = ∅
|I (i, r − 1)|−1 ∑ j∈I (i,r−1) x j (r − 1) otherwise,
where I (i, r − 1) = {k ∈ {1, . . . , n} : |xi (r − 1) − xk(r − 1)| ≤ ε ∧ k = i}.
5. [Authorities] For i = 1 to n, set authPointi to
{
xi (r − 1) if A(i, r − 1) = ∅
|A(i, r − 1)|−1 ∑ j∈A(i,r−1) authView j otherwise,
and set authTotInfli to |A(i, r − 1)| ∗ authInfl, where A(i, r − 1) = {k ∈
{1, . . . , authNr} : |xi (r − 1) − authViewk | ≤ authRnge ∧ authBegk ≤ r ≤
authBegk + authDurk}.
6. [Age] For i = 1 to n, decrease rToLivei by 1.
7. [New views] For i = 1 to n, set xi (r) to
consInfl ∗ consPointi + peerInfl ∗ peerPointi + authTotInfli ∗ authPointi + TInfl ∗ T
consInfl + peerInfl + authTotInfli + TInfl
.
8. [Shifts] For i = 1 to n, if |S(i, r−1)| > 0 then set xi (r) to xi (r)+shftPull∗shftDir j
where j = min({m : m ∈ S(i, r − 1)}) and S(i, r − 1) = {k ∈ {1, . . . , shftNr} :
|xi (r − 1) − shftCntrk | ≤ shftRnge ∧ shftRndk = r}.
9. [Successors] For i = 1 to n, if rToLivei = 0 then set xi (r) to a random real number
between xi (r − 1) − mutRnge and xi (r − 1) + mutRnge such that 0 ≤ xi (r) ≤ 1
and set rToLivei to a random integer between peerMinAge and peerMaxAge.
10. [Done?] If r < R then go back to step 2 otherwise terminate. ❙
As emphasized above, the values of the parameters are to some extent arbitrary.
Therefore, in order to neutralize the objection that our results depend too heavily on
these values, we have performed a series of simulations that help to assess the robust-
ness of our results. Briefly put, it turns out that even if the values of the parameters are
significantly altered, the outcome of the simulations will be more or less the same. We
iterated the simulation 10,000 times, under the assumptions that moral facts exist, each
time with new randomly chosen values that were up to fifty percent higher or lower
than the initial values described above. (The maximum and minimum values we used
are listed in the two rightmost columns of Table 1.)10 At the end of each simulation,
the distance between the opinions being furthest away was measured. Fig. 9 shows the
relative number of times the distance between the opinions being furthest away were
between 0 and 0.1 units, and between 0.1 and 0.2 units, and so on. Fig. 10 shows the
10 In case peerMaxAge turns out be lower than peerMinAge, the former is set to peerMinAge.
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Table 1 Parameters
Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6 Fig. 7 Fig. 12 Fig. 13 Fig. 14 Min Max
R 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
n 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 25 75
ε 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.15
peerMinAge 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 15 45
peerMaxAge 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 35 105
mutRnge 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.075 0.225
authNr 5 5 5 50 5 5 5 2 8
authMinDur 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 15
authMaxDur 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 15 45
authRnge 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.175 0.525
shftNr 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 8
shftRnge 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.075 0.225
shftPull 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.15
consInfl 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 100 300
peerInfl 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1.5
authInfl 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1.5 4.5
TInfl 0 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1.5
T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
constAuthNr 1 7 7
constAuthInfl 10 100 20
constAuthRnge 0.35 0.08 0.08
same plot under the assumption that moral facts do not exist. It seems to be relatively
difficult to resist the conclusion that the non-existence of moral facts is a necessary
condition for persistent moral disagreement.
Fig. 11 shows what happens if the location of the moral fact is determined by an
evenly distributed random variable. As can be seen in the figure, this yields slightly
more disagreement compared to the situation in which the value of the fact is 0, but
the difference is not dramatic. We have not been able to find any clear explanation of
this effect. However, a possible conclusion one could draw is that if moral facts exist




1. Initialize 2. Increase round 3. Conservatism 4. Peers 5. Authorities
6. Age7. New views8. Shifts9. Successors10. Done?
Fig. 8 Flow chart for the simulation algorithm
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Fig. 9 Range of disagreement after 1000 rounds in 10,000 randomized simulations with moral facts at
T = 0







Fig. 10 Range of disagreement after 1000 rounds in 10,000 randomized simulations without moral facts
4 Constant authorities
In Sect. 2 we briefly mentioned that some authorities, such as the Church, may influ-
ence our moral opinions over very long periods of time. From a modelling perspective,
the Church can be conceived as a constant authority, i.e., as an authority that affects
our opinions in all rounds. How does the presence of one or more constant authorities
affect the robustness of our conclusion?
Figure 12 shows a simulation with a moral fact at 0 and a constant authority near
1. A possible example could be a situation in which it is, say, wrong not to allow
gay marriages although the Church holds the opposite view. Naturally, at most two
opinions will survive in the long run, no matter the relative strength of the fact and
the constant authority. (In this particular example, the second surviving opinion is just
below 1. This is due to the relative strength of the moral fact and the opinion preached
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Fig. 11 Range of disagreement after 1000 rounds in 10,000 randomized simulations with randomized
moral facts











Fig. 12 Disagreement and facts with a constant authority
by the Church.) However, this is clearly not a correct account of how moral opinions
evolve over time. Our opinions do not tend to converge to two extreme views. On the
contrary, nearly all opinions between the two extremes tend to be represented when
people disagree on moral issues. Moreover, in Fig. 12 all change is change towards an
extreme view, and once that view has been reached the individual never departs from
it in the future. This is implausible. Therefore, Fig. 12 is not a convincing picture of
how people do actually reason about moral issues. This indicates that the non-sceptic
moral realist has little reason for thinking that the disagreement we observe is due to
the existence of some (possibly incorrect) constant authorities, such as the Church.
At this point it might be objected that non-sceptic moral realists could try to make
their claim about moral facts compatible with the prevalence of widespread moral
disagreement by simply increasing the number of constant authorities. Fig. 13 shows a
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Fig. 13 Many constant authorities and a single fact











Fig. 14 Less influential constant authorities and a single fact enables more change
scenario with seven constant authorities and a single fact. Unfortunately, this figure also
fails to give a convincing account of how moral opinions evolve over time. Although
we can now observe considerable disagreement, people in this simulation simply do
not change their opinions as much as they sometimes do in real life. Moreover, in
Fig. 13 all change is change towards a constant authority, and once the individual
holds the same view as the authority, he or she will never depart from it in the future.
This is implausible. We therefore conclude that this is not a convincing non-sceptic
moral realist picture of moral disagreement.
However, let us consider yet another way in which the non-sceptic moral realist
could try to rescue his position. This time we assume that constant authorities are
much less influential than before and that people are more likely to randomly change
their opinions; see Fig. 14 and Table 1 for details. During the first couple of rounds
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this figure appears to give a plausible account of how disagreement could be possible
despite the existence of an objective moral fact that influence people’s opinions. As
can be seen in the figure, people do actually change their opinions over time. How-
ever, a potential problem for the non-sceptic moral realist is that after a few hundred
rounds some parts of the opinion space is empty, or almost empty. No one holds views
that are close to those of the two uppermost authorities. That said, the figure suggests
that there are some assumptions under which epistemically efficacious moral facts are
compatible with persistent disagreement. Thus, a possible way to defend non-sceptic
moral realism is to argue that some assumptions that generate this type of scenario are
indeed the correct ones.
Finally, another approach that would guarantee persistent disagreement, regard-
less of any facts, is to significantly increase the effect of randomness on the peers.
If mutRnge is sufficiently high and peerMinAge sufficiently low, then a large number
of peers in each round will have a random view independently of any peers in earlier
rounds and any other factors. This move will trivially ensure persistent disagreement.
However, this would result in a peculiar version of moral realism; while moral facts
would have some influence on our moral opinions this influence would nevertheless
be drowned out by the influence of chance.
5 A better foundation for the Argument from Disagreement?
In the introduction we identified two weaknesses of traditional treatments of the
Argument from Disagreement, namely, (i) the absence of an explanation of why the
non-existence of moral facts leads to moral disagreement, and (ii) the absence of an
explanation of why we disagree on some moral issues but not on all.
The results presented in this paper offer new insights into both these issues. We
have shown that under a wide range of empirical assumptions the absence of moral
facts is a necessary although not a sufficient condition for persistent disagreement
(of the right structure). If moral facts were to exist, and if our opinions have long been
affected by them to at least some non-negligible degree, then consensus would have
emerged quickly. Moreover, if our moral opinions were also affected by some constant
authorities the resulting disagreement would in many cases not be of the right struc-
ture, as explained in Sect. 4. This means that the basic premise of the Argument from
Disagreement has gained some additional support: If moral facts existed we would
not disagree widely on controversial issues, such as abortion and capital punishment.
However, we do in fact disagree widely on many such issues.
The observation that the absence of moral facts (under a wide range of empiri-
cal assumptions) merely is a necessary and not a sufficient condition for persistent
disagreement also helps to explain why we disagree on some moral issues but not on
all. The point is that consensus can arise even if no moral facts exist. The simulations
have revealed several such consensus-inducing mechanisms apart from moral facts.
As shown above, the challenge is to show how persistent disagreement is possible, not
to explain consensus.
Having said all this, it might be objected that our model proves too much. There is
also considerable disagreement about whether there is life in other galaxies, whether
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there is a god, and on exactly what Aristotle tried to tell us about the virtues. So
does not our model predict that agreement should have emerged a long time ago on
all these controversial issues? Our reply is that our model merely predicts that we
would quickly reach consensus if our opinions were affected at least to some degree
by the fact of the matter (towards the fact, not in the other direction). In the examples
mentioned above most of our opinions are presumably not positively affected by any
fact of the matter. Of course, this does not imply that there cannot be any objectively
true answer to these questions. All we are entitled to conclude from our simulations
is that whenever there is persistent disagreement the truth has not positively affected
our opinions.
One might also object that our computer simulations are self-defeating.11 This is
because we seem to disagree not just on issues related to normative ethics, but also on
many issues in meta-ethics, including the question whether non-sceptic moral realism
is true. So if our model is correct, then there cannot be any fact about whether non-
sceptic moral realism is correct that influences our meta-ethical opinions, since such a
fact would have lead to agreement. One might therefore wonder how our model could
support this meta-ethical fact. The answer is that our model merely implies that the
fact about whether non-sceptic moral realism is correct has not affected our opinions
in the past. This does not rule out that our ability to let our future opinions be affected
by the relevant facts might increase as we adopt new methodological approaches to
meta-ethics. One such new approach is the computer simulation presented in this
paper. Therefore, our simulation is not self-defeating.
The same move is of course open to the non-sceptic moral realist. While our simu-
lation might have shown that there does not exist any moral facts that have influenced
our moral opinions in the past, there might exist moral facts that will do so in the
future. Perhaps some new methods in normative ethics will enable us to access the
truth. It seems unlikely that any argument from past disagreement can rule out this
possibility.
6 Conclusion
By showing how the Argument from Disagreement can be modelled in a computer
simulation, we have shed new light on this influential argument. As explained above,
our findings seem to lend some additional support to the rejection of non-sceptic moral
realism, at least under a wide range of empirical assumptions about how moral opinions
evolve over time. However, the most important conclusion is perhaps that the meth-
odology we use appears to be fruitful for moral philosophers wishing to discuss the
meta-ethical significance of moral disagreement. By giving up some of the seemingly
plausible assumptions we use in our model, it may very well be possible to construct
some version of moral realism that is immune to the Argument from Disagreement—if
so, this would then tell us something important about the structure of a plausible form
of moral realism. We thus conclude that computer simulations provide us with a new
tool for assessing meta-ethical debates about moral disagreement.
11 This objection was suggested to us by Jonas Olson.
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